[Newsship] How to deal with North Korea, which wants to fire nuclear weapons first?

Many people are concerned about what will happen if Putin's Russia uses nuclear weapons during the war against Ukraine.

However, perhaps even more dangerous things are happening on the Korean Peninsula.

Kim Jong-un's North Korea has nailed it by law that it will preemptively launch a nuclear attack if they believe that this is not the case. (On policy of the Republic of Korea's nuclear force>) All of the major

nuclear powers have up to now adhered to the principle of 'non-use of nuclear weapons first', 'unless they are attacked with nuclear weapons first, do not attack with nuclear weapons'.

Even if the United States and the former Soviet Union were virtually defeated in the conventional war and withdrew, they did not launch a nuclear preemptive strike.

Even so, North Korea says it will fire nuclear weapons first.

In announcing a decree to this effect, Kim Jong-un personally delivered a speech at the Supreme People's Assembly, emphasizing that there would be no negotiations on denuclearization.

First, let's look at the main contents of the law and what Kim Jong-un revealed in his speech, and discuss how to deal with North Korea.

Enlarging an image

According to the National Security Strategy Institute report (Issue Brief No. 389, dated September 14), this North Korean law has the following main characteristics.

Enlarging an image

Until now, it had been expected that North Korea would use nuclear weapons in an extremely unfavorable situation or as a last resort.

The decision to establish a new operational plan including tactical nuclear weapons in June can also be understood as an extension of this.

In addition, this North Korean decree stipulates that all situations in which nuclear weapons will be used are “ if it is

”.

It states that it will use nuclear weapons based on arbitrary and subjective perceptions of the situation, and it stipulates that even if neither South Korea nor the United States attacked North Korea, they could use nuclear weapons if they "deemed it a threat" from their point of view.

It is also noteworthy that "a nuclear strike is automatically and immediately carried out according to a pre-determined operational plan if the command and control system for the national nuclear force is in danger."

In other words, if there is an attack on Kim Jong-un or the command and control system is disrupted due to a sudden change, the front-line nuclear units will automatically fire a nuclear missile.

It is a threat that nuclear weapons can be used even if there are signs that an external attack will be attempted, such as a beheading operation against North Korean military leaders such as Kim Jong-un, or even if there is internal chaos such as a coup d'état by the North Korean authorities or an uprising of the people.

Declaration that 'Jim is a nuclear weapon'

Before defecting to North Korea, Rep. Tae Young-ho of People's Strength served as a ambassador to the UK.

Since his mission was to promote North Korea's nuclear policy to Europe and assert its legitimacy, he is someone who understands the meaning of the North Korean government's words better than anyone else.

In a recent Voice of America (VOA) broadcast interview, he interpreted it as the same as Kim Jong-un's declaration that 'the burden is a nuclear weapon' like the former King Louis XIV of France.

Enlarging an image

"I am in charge of the nuclear force. But what if I die? Fire the nukes automatically as already written. Put simply, are you guys aiming to collapse the North Korean regime? After all, that's my life, and I'm a nuclear weapon. What is my role in the end? My living is the control over the North Korean nuclear force, and my living is the deterrent to preventing nuclear war. So if you kill me, the children below will automatically shoot. This has been legislated."

(VOA, September 11, phone interview)

This is also revealed through Kim Jong-un's own speech.

In a speech on the administration of the Supreme People's Assembly on September 8, there is a passage where Kim Jong-un says:

"Our people are well aware of the numerous historical events of the 20th and 21st centuries, which ended in tragic endings with tragic endings due to the wrong choice, overcome by the clichéd sermons, sophistry, sanctions and pressure of the American imperialists, and military threats."

The 'wrong choice' that Kim Jong-un refers to is giving up nuclear weapons.

Although 'our people' is the subject, this sentence is read as expressing the fear in Kim Jong-un's own heart.

There is a typical case where the dictator's life ended miserably when nuclear weapons were released.

Gaddafi of Libya.

Enlarging an image

Perhaps that is why, in his speech, Kim Jong-un emphasizes the point several times that there is no negotiating nuclear renunciation.

It's like this.

“There is absolutely no first to give up nuclear weapons, there is no denuclearization, and there is no negotiation for it, no bargaining machine for that process. Nuclear is our national prestige, national state, the absolute strength of the republic, and the great pride of the Korean people.”

“We will not pursue an improved and tangible economic and living environment in exchange for nuclear weapons that guarantee the safety of our government and future generations, and we will not change our choices even if we go through hard times.”

"There is a significant significance in the legalization of the nuclear force policy here, where we have drawn a line of indecision so that we can no longer haggle over our nuclear weapons."

Enlarging an image

Now, how should we deal with this kind of Kim Jong-un?

The first person that came to my mind while contemplating which expert's opinion would be best to listen to was Chun Young-woo, chairman of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum.

As a diplomat, he has dealt with the North Korean nuclear issue since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the mid-1990s.

When the U.S. and North Korea agreed to build a nuclear power plant in North Korea under the Geneva Agreement, he experienced the internal affairs of North Korea by visiting the construction site.

He is a top expert on the issue of Security Council sanctions against North Korea's ballistic missile launches.

During his successive high-level positions in the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak administrations, he experienced both camps' policy frameworks toward North Korea and the United States.

He also has a wide range of knowledge covering the defense and military fields, which is also a strength.

In January 2011, it was this man who suggested the 'Operation at Dawn of the Gulf of Aden' to the president to rescue our ships and hostages hijacked by Somali pirates and carried it out.

In 2012, he had a discussion with a White House security adviser to completely revise the Korea-U.S. Missile Guidelines, laying the groundwork for dramatically enhancing South Korea's missile capabilities.

Enlarging an image

He just published a book this spring.

The title is "The President's Diplomatic and Security Agenda".

It explains issues that need to be understood regardless of who sits in the president's office, which serves as both the head of Korean diplomacy and commander of the military, so that they can look at it from an international perspective without being immersed in domestic political interests.

Why is North Korea's nuclear problem a problem, why does it always come and go? It deals with a variety of things, such as what should be done.

Enlarging an image

This time, I called because I was curious about how I would see North Korea's new declaration that it would never give up its nuclear weapons, and whether there would be any updates to the contents of the book.

We called to see if it was embarrassing for us, but we got an unexpectedly cool response.

"I don't think there's much difference between what North Korea announces and what it doesn't."

Enlarging an image

rather good?

The reason why there is no big difference whether North Korea enacts nuclear law or not

He said that, in a sense, it was rather good.

In fact, there are many people in Korea who have the expectation that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons if it does well to North Korea (that is, if they provide the desired 'abandonment of hostile policy', 'system security guarantee', 'removal of sanctions and economic support').

The previous government's North Korean nuclear policy was largely based on such expectations.

This time, North Korea said, 'There is absolutely no such thing as giving up nuclear weapons in return.

The shouting 'I will not give up nuclear weapons' has the effect of pouring cold water on the romantic view of North Korea in some parts of the country.

Chairman Chun Young-woo saw that the fact that North Korea enacted a decree had no meaning in itself.

There will be no voluntarily giving up nuclear weapons anyway, and if there is a situation where it is necessary to give up nuclear weapons involuntarily, then even if there is a law, it is useless.

Enlarging an image

'Ability' is important, not intention

In his book, Chairman Chun Young-woo criticized North Korea's 'intentions' as having problems with the approach, or even exaggerating the intentions.

This story is presented in the book.

For example, after meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang in March 2018, the presidential special delegation announced to the media that Kim Jong-un had "cleared his commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and visited the United States to report directly to President Trump.

However, the U.S. decided to send CIA Director Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang to directly confirm Kim Jong-un's intentions because of doubts about Kim Jong-un's will for denuclearization delivered by special envoy Chung Eui-yong.

It is said that Kim Jong-un never made clear his intentions for denuclearization to Pompeo in the end and did nothing more than vaguely remark that "I don't want my children to carry nuclear weapons for the rest of their lives."

- From "The President's Diplomatic and Security Agenda" by Cheon Young-woo

He emphasizes that it is important that North Korea has the 'nuclear capability' to threaten us with nuclear weapons, no matter what it says, and that we have the ability to stop it.

Enlarging an image

To do that, it must be prepared militarily strong enough to prevent North Korea from thinking of going to war prematurely even with nuclear weapons.

However, if we increase our armaments and strengthen the ROK-U.S. joint drills, wouldn't it happen that North Korea is 'threatened' and puts its hands on nuclear weapons?

When I asked if there are people who have such fears, he replied:

“The most important thing for North Korea is that it has the capability to deny North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons and is always ready to demonstrate its ability to reject it whenever such a situation arises. “Even if Russia has the capability, it is not properly trained and is not well prepared, so it continues to be pushed by less than a third of the country by force.”

The illusion that North Korea will launch a nuclear weapon if we stimulate it

Still, some people are worried about what will happen if the exercises between the ROK and the US or the US deployment of nuclear assets on the Korean Peninsula stimulate North Korea.

His answer was:

“There is no reason we should deliberately provoke North Korea to use nuclear weapons. But regardless of that, there will come a time when North Korea must use nuclear weapons even if we do not stimulate it.”

“Normally, when North Korea is not in danger of survival of such a regime, they do not use nuclear weapons recklessly just because we provoke them.”

Enlarging an image

The problem is that Kim Jong-un's judgment on such a situation would be very arbitrary.

In the words of Chairman Cheon Young-woo.

“If we think that it is useful to delay the end of the regime by even one day, then we will use nuclear weapons preemptively. That is when it is most dangerous. When "to use, this is the most important

thing. That judgment is subjective. If North Korea believes that it is imminent even though it is not imminent at all, these people are people who see ghosts even in broad daylight."

That is why North Korea itself is dangerous to have nuclear capabilities.

Enlarging an image

North Korea's 'Profit and Loss Structure' Needs to Be Changed

Since North Korea is not a normal country, the North Korean nuclear issue has characteristics that are different from other countries' possession of nuclear weapons.

According to Chairman Cheon Young-woo, there is no nuclear war between the United States and Russia, the United States and China, India and Pakistan, etc., because of the following profit and loss structure.

1) If we attack with nuclear weapons first, we will also receive retaliation for punishment with nuclear weapons.

As a result, it must be destroyed.

2) If nuclear weapons are not used first, there is no problem in maintaining survival.

Therefore, there is no reason to self-destruct through the preemptive use of nuclear weapons.

However, this universal principle does not apply to North Korea.

.

For example, if a sudden change occurs inside North Korea and the Kim Jong-un regime is pushed to the brink, Kim Jong-un may reach a situation in which he will have to massacre uprising residents in order to maintain his regime.

At this time, the ROK and the US and the international community can attempt military intervention to prevent a humanitarian disaster.

Kim Jong-un sees that his power and the fate of his system depend on whether or not to stop it, so he can go ahead with the preemptive use of nuclear weapons.

.

If Kim Jong-un does not use nuclear weapons, the end of the regime cannot be avoided, and if he judges that a nuclear attack can reduce the possibility of the end of the regime by even 1% or extend his regime by one more day, no matter how powerful the military power of the ROK and the United States is Even if you do, there may come a time when the coercion fails.

This is because North Korea is not a normal country, but a dynasty in which state power is completely privatized by the Kim family, and 'associative defense' of 'supreme dignity' is equated with protecting the country.

It is not for nothing that North Korea still uses the country name 'Joseon'.

Think back to King Seonjo, who thought that if he or she escaped to the Ming dynasty, the people would keep the Jongmyo Sajik, whether they died or not.

Enlarging an image

“If you don’t do that, no matter how much (North Korea) says it will give up its nuclear weapons, it is just a lie. No matter how much you tell North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons until the profit and loss structure is changed, North Korea will not do it even if the profit structure has not changed. If you say you're going to give up this nuclear weapon, you're doing it with a different intention."

We can't let the economy develop without giving up nuclear weapons.

In order for Kim Jong-un to remain in power safely, he needs to feed his people and make them prosperous.

In his speech on the 8th, the stress that Kim Jong-un is experiencing due to this problem is expressed in several places.

For example, he says that he has endured great pain and national hardship to complete the nuclear force.

“Our dear people and children had to tighten their belts and tighten their stomachs more, and all our precious families had to suffer tremendous hardships. Although it was an inevitable choice for a greater victory, it must be prepared at a great price. It was a tough first road that no one had ever walked on, and the outcome could not be predicted easily.”

The passage in which he vowed not to give out nuclear weapons first for an economic reward, on the other hand, gives the impression that the economic stress is too great.

Enlarging an image

Kim Jong-un's line is a nuclear-economy parallel route.

He said that he would also strengthen nuclear armament and, based on that, receive support from the international community to develop my economy.

North Korea's goal is to resolve both security and economic issues by making the US abandon its 'hostile policy toward Korea', and to maintain its maximum nuclear capability for the longest period of time in the process.

In fact, this was the goal that Kim Jong-un pursued during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics-Inter-Korean summit and the North Korea-US summit in Singapore.

Although the greed was too much, the Hanoi summit ended in catastrophic rejection by Trump.

Enlarging an image

North Korea has no way out of harsh sanctions without giving up its nuclear weapons.

This is the strong leverage we have on North Korea.

Nevertheless, the last government tried to persuade major countries around the world to loosen the sanctions, but only received a cold response.

If there is a way to grow the economy without going through the process of giving up nuclear weapons, there is no reason for North Korea to go the path of giving up its nuclear weapons.

Enlarging an image

'Leverage', not like/dislike, determines negotiations

'Leverage' refers to the power to change the opponent's policy.

Our leverage depends on our ability and willingness to make it difficult for North Korea to survive or, conversely, to solve North Korea's pressing existential problems.

North Korea's leverage comes from its ability and willingness to harm South Korea and the United States.

Even if North Korea has a crush on our government, it cannot be 'leveraged' to move North Korea unless we have the ability and will to give or take away what North Korea wants.

Leverage is the essence of bargaining power, and the outcome of negotiations is determined by the balance of leverage.

Enlarging an image

Chairman Cheon pointed out that the fundamental reason for North Korea's decisive opposition to the ROK-US joint exercise is that it increases the leverage of both countries while reducing North Korea's leverage.

When will North Korea come up for dialogue?

Chairman Cheon Young-woo is not someone who argues that dialogue is useless.

In the book, he said, 'If inter-Korean relations are good, good or bad, inter-Korean dialogue is necessary.'

Through dialogue, information necessary to understand the interests, priorities, and structure of interests of the North Korean authorities can be obtained. As this is reinforced, the door to dialogue should always be left open.

However, he points out that it is bad to keep begging North Korea for dialogue because of the withdrawal phenomenon, and to be impatient to use it in domestic politics after achieving results within the term of the regime.

In a phone interview, he said:

"I don't want to talk, but I don't think it's particularly different if you stalk us to keep talking. It's enough to show that you can talk whenever you want. I don't want to talk, but I don't think there's any need to keep following them and urging them to talk. "

This means that if North Korea needs our government's help and determines that there is something to be gained through dialogue, it is bound to come to the dialogue.

It has always been like that in the past.

Enlarging an image

However, what conditions must be met for such a conversation to be possible?

Enlarging an image

Chairman Cheon Young-woo said, “Do you know why North Korea suddenly switched to negotiations by creating an atmosphere of dialogue during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics?”

Enlarging an image

Chairman Chun Young-woo is predicting that North Korea will not respond to the negotiations until it has done everything it can to develop a tactical nuclear weapon and conduct a necessary nuclear test.

Enlarging an image

“Isn’t those people supposed to have a nuclear development goal right now? They have developed a strategic nuclear missile that goes to the United States, and they say they want to make it multiple warheads, and they say they will make a tactical nuclear weapon by making the warhead smaller and lighter… Then they have to experiment a few more times to detonate it. Then, new sanctions will follow, and North Korea knows that it is useless to talk until all that is done."

Enlarging an image

Why nuclear weapons are not the answer

In order to deter a nuclear-armed North Korea, should we either equip ourselves with nuclear weapons or share the US tactical nuclear weapons so that we can use them?

He also explained this in detail in the book.

His striking point is that even if we have nuclear weapons in our hands, North Korea will not be afraid of them, so it is difficult to act as a deterrent.

In North Korea's perception, the level of nuclear force itself is terrifying, but the US is terrifying because it is a 'if you do it' country, while South Korea says that it will not believe in North Korea even if it promises to use nukes in case of emergency.

It should also be taken into account that the moment it withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in order to arm itself with nuclear weapons, the sale of nuclear fuel to South Korea is internationally banned.

As the energy crisis is a serious international crisis, there is no need for a long explanation of the changes in our lives that nuclear power cannot be used.

Nevertheless, there is absolutely no reason why we cannot arm ourselves with nuclear weapons if there is no alternative other than our own independent nuclear armament to protect the lives and safety of the people. ), the explanation of Chairman Cheon is that it is much better in reality.

In other words,

there is no problem in deterring North Korea by nuclear weapons even without independent nuclear armament

However, the problem is that it is not easy to satisfy the conditions in quotation marks.

The ROK-US alliance is not free, it is a ROK-US 'mutual defense' treaty.

It's a 'give and take' relationship.

The strengthening of the ROK-US alliance is a high-level equation in which domestic politics, economy, and Korea-Japan-Korea-China relations are all intertwined.

There are many challenges that the government has to solve.

(Composition/Editing: Hyunsik Lee, D Contents Producer / Content Design: Jisoo Ok, Park Soo-min)